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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether the quality of a firm‟s corporate governance practices and its 
sustainability disclosures are inversely related to its assessed default risk.  It is expected that high reported 
standards of corporate governance will reduce the assessment of a company‟s default risk by lenders, 
underwriters and ratings agencies, and therefore reduce the cost of debt for such companies.  A corporate 
governance index based on annual report disclosures was developed to rate each company‟s corporate 
governance quality.  Derivation of this index was centred on corporate governance indicators suggested 
by prior research and best practice; particularly the Australian Stock Exchange “Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations”.  It is similarly expected that the voluntary 
disclosure of sustainability information (Corporate Social Reporting or CSR) will enhance a firm‟s 
management reputation. The assessment of default risk is captured by a firm‟s individual credit rating 
supplied by Standard and Poor‟s.  Our results indicate that neither annual report disclosures about 
corporate governance practices nor sustainability disclosures are significantly related to assessed default 
risk when firm size is controlled.   
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates whether the quality of a firm‟s corporate governance and its sustainability 
disclosures are inversely related to its assessed default risk.  Lenders are an important group of annual 
report users, and it is therefore important to know whether such disclosures made in these reports are 
useful for assessing default risk.  We investigate this relationship in the Australian setting. It is expected 
that high perceived standards of corporate governance will reduce the assessment of a company‟s default 
risk by lenders and underwriters, and therefore reduce the cost of debt for such companies.  It is further 
expected that the voluntary disclosure of sustainability information will signal effective management and 
therefore reduced perceived default risk. 
There have been several recent studies investigating the relationship between corporate 
governance and the cost of debt or factors expected to be closely related to it.  Their results indicate 
support for a relationship between aspects of corporate governance quality and the cost of debt. (Bhojraj 
and Sengupta 2003, Anderson, Sattar and Reeb 2004, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond 2006) The 
most recent of these studies by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) found that credit ratings are negatively 
associated with the number of blockholders and CEO power, and positively related to takeover defences, 
accrual quality, earnings timeliness, board independence, board stock ownership and board expertise.   
The majority of prior studies restricted their analysis to a limited set of governance variables, for 
example Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) investigated board independence and institutional ownership, while 
Anderson et al. (2004) examined board characteristics and the cost of debt for S & P 500 firms in the 
United States and found cost of debt to be inversely related to board size and independence and also audit 
committee independence, size and meeting frequency.  In this study we take a thorough approach to the 
measurement of governance practices and develop a comprehensive corporate governance index.  Our 
index is centred on corporate governance disclosures related to the ASX Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations.  This approach allows us to test whether these 
governance practices disclosed in the annual reports are useful when assessing default risk.  
Regulatory bodies around the world have attempted to define what constitutes high quality corporate 
governance.  The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) issued ten core “Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations” to apply to company reports for the first financial year 
after 1 January 2003 (effectively the year ending 30 June 2004 for most Australian companies). Since this 
time firms have been obliged to report any departures from the Principles, but they were encouraged to 
assess their compliance as early as possible.  Thus, while disclosure about corporate governance practices 
was voluntary in Australia in 2003 and prior, a considerable amount of disclosure was present.
1
 
One potential factor that motivates a company and its directors to voluntarily disclose information 
regarding corporate governance is that these disclosures reduce the apparent risk of investment in the 
company, and hence its external financing costs. Effective corporate governance allows accurate 
performance monitoring, and promotes stability and market and investor confidence, and hence reduces 
perceived risk. “Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
                                                        
1 There are several reasons why companies might have chosen to voluntarily disclose information about their corporate governance policies 
and practices.  The research literature provides evidence that annual report disclosures reveal credible, relevant information that is priced 
by investors, reduces estimation risk and information asymmetry, and reduces the cost of equity capital for firms with a low analyst 
following. (Lang and Lundholm 1996, Botosan 1997, Botosan and Plumlee 2002, Lundholm and Myers 2002) 
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assure themselves of getting a return on their investment,” per Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
2
 Agency theory 
suggests that stakeholders seek to reduce information asymmetry. Financiers need the management 
expertise but this leaves managers with significant control rights and the question of how financiers can 
ensure these are not exercised for the benefit of shareholders or managers‟ personal gain at the expense of 
bondholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). To the extent that governance is an important determinant of 
default risk, its perceived strength can have a significant effect on estimating that risk.  Weak governance 
can impair a firm‟s financial position and ability to repay its debts.  A firm‟s credit rating reflects a rating 
agency‟s opinion of an entity‟s overall creditworthiness and its capacity to satisfy its financial obligations 
(Standard & Poor‟s, 2002) 
Although the detailed methodology used for developing corporate credit ratings by firms such as 
Standard & Poor‟s (S & P) and Moody‟s is not public information, it is reasonable to assume that an 
assessment of a company‟s internal regulation and corporate governance practices would be a factor in 
assessing the default risk level for lenders. A number of US studies have found a positive association 
between aspects of corporate governance and firm value (Lundholm and Myers 2002; Botosan 1997; 
Botosan and Plumlee 2002; Lang and Lundholm 1996, 2000) and a few have extended this to explore the 
association between aspects of corporate governance and perceived credit risk and therefore cost of debt. 
(Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2006, and Anderson et al. 2004) S & P have described their rating methodology as encompassing four 
main areas: industry risk (operating risk), business risk (specific company risk factors and keys to success), 
financial risk (based on quantitative ratios and a qualitative review of financial policy) and liquidity risk 
(financing needs and cash flow).
3
 S & P describe their ratings in the introduction to the Code of Practices 
and Procedures as “a valuable tool in the global capital markets for the evaluation and assessment of credit 
risk.” 
Research has also suggested that firms may (successfully) use corporate social and environmental 
(sustainability) reporting to “legitimise various aspects of their respective organisations” (Deegan (2002) 
p.282). If the motivation for disclosing this additional voluntary information is to increase the credibility 
and enhance the reputation of the management of the organisation, then this should reduce the perceived 
risk of that organisation from a lender‟s perspective, if they accept the intended message. This view is 
further supported by research suggesting that organisations may use corporate social responsibility and 
sustainability reporting as a vehicle for reputation risk management (Bebbington et.al. (2008) and 
commentary by Unerman (2008)). Schneider (2008) argues that the market values a firm‟s environmental 
performance in assessing risk and a firm‟s cost of debt capital. Again, agency theory is applicable as the 
debt market may perceive a proactive environmental strategy as an indication that management are not 
pursuing short-term profit strategies for the benefit of shareholders at the expense of bondholders. A 
proactive management stance on sustainability issues could similarly be positively interpreted. Firms with 
superior sustainability may disclose more information about their sustainability to differentiate themselves 
from firms with inferior sustainability. Voluntary disclosure theory (see Dye 1985) predicts that high 
quality companies have incentives to report more extensively to distinguish themselves from lower quality 
companies. This theory has been applied to voluntary environmental performance disclosure (Clarkson et 
al. (2008)). These authors demonstrate a positive relationship between environmental performance per se 
and the level of voluntary environmental disclosures. This prior research and theory suggests that 
                                                        
2
Scleifer & Vishny (1997) p.742 
3Presentation made by Chris Dalton, Managing Director, Standard & Poor‟s Australia & New Zealand, Melbourne Financial Services 
Symposium, Wednesday 17th March 2004. 
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voluntary sustainability reporting can be used to indicate underlying superior performance in sustainable 
practices. 
We use the following hypotheses to test the relationships between corporate governance practices 
and sustainability disclosures found in annual reports and assessed default risk in the Australian setting: 
H1 Credit ratings are positively related to the quality of corporate governance practices 
H2 Credit ratings are positively related to the voluntary disclosure of sustainability information 
The methodology used to test these hypotheses is described in the next section. For the purposes of 
this paper quality of corporate governance is defined as a high score on our corporate governance index. 
The quality of sustainability disclosures is not measured directly; instead the volume of sustainability or 
CSR  information (as identified by the firm) disclosed in the annual report or as a separate statement is 
used as the proxy, given that any disclosure on this issue is voluntary. The methodology section is followed 
by the results of our analysis and conclusions. 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Development of a Corporate Governance Index 
A corporate governance index based on annual report disclosures was developed to rate each 
company‟s corporate governance quality.  Derivation of this index was centred on corporate governance 
indicators suggested by prior research and best practice, such as the Australian Stock Exchange “Principles 
of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations” (ASX Principles).  Table 1 
summarises the corporate governance index.  The maximum possible score was 26 (7 disclosure, 15 
independence, 2 external audit, 2 procedures). Each company‟s corporate governance score (CGSCORE) 
was calculated by dividing their total score by this maximum possible score, to express it as a proportion 
for ease of comparability
4
. 
 
TABLE 1 – Corporate Governance Index 
 
DISCLOSURE  Maximum 
The annual statements contain a statement 
addressing corporate governance. 
1 or 0 1 
Reference is made to the ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles 
1 or 0 1 
An assessment is made regarding current  
compliance with the ASX Principles  
1 for a general overview 
2 if the review is 
detailed 
2 
The qualifications of the Board members are 
disclosed 
1 or 0 1 
                                                        
4
 As an additional check, the models were also computed using the raw corporate governance scores (not scaling by 26) and this made no 
impact on the correlation or regression results.  
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Table 1 continued… 
The relevant experience of the Board members 
is disclosed 
1 or 0 1 
Members‟ attendance at meetings is disclosed 1 or 0 1 
TOTAL DISCLOSURE  7 
INDEPENDENCE   
CEO not same person as Board chairman 1 or  1 
BOARD   
Board size (average membership) Noted only  
Proportion non-executive members x/1 1 
Proportion of independent members x/1 1 
Independent chairperson 1 or 0 1 
Number of meetings during year: Six or more 
Less than 6 
Not disclosed 
1 point 
0 points 
0 points 
 
 
1 
AUDIT COMMITTEE   
Committee size (average membership) Noted only  
Proportion non-executive members x/1 1 
Proportion of independent members x/1 1 
Independent chairperson 1 or 0 1 
Number of meetings during year: Four or more 
Less than 4 
Not disclosed 
1 point 
0 points 
0 points 
 
 
1 
REMUNERATION COMMITTEE   
Committee size (average membership) Noted only  
Proportion non-executive members x/1, zero if no 
committee 
1 
Proportion of independent members x/1, zero if no 
committee 
1 
Independent chairperson 1 or 0 1 
NOMINATION COMMITTEE   
Committee size (average membership) Noted only  
Proportion non-executive members x/1, zero if no 
committee 
1 
Proportion of independent members x/1, zero if no 
committee 
1 
Independent chairperson 1 or 0 1 
TOTAL INDEPENDENCE  15 
EXTERNAL AUDIT   
„Big Four‟ audit 1 or 0 1 
Proportion of audit/other fees x/1 1 
TOTAL EXTERANAL AUDIT  2 
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Table 1 continued… 
PROCEDURES   
Role/duties of Board clear (e.g. Charter) 1 or 0, 0 if not disclosed  
Company has a Code of Conduct 1 or 0, 0 if not disclosed  
TOTAL PROCEDURES  2 
MAXIMUM POSSIBLE SCORE  26 
 
2.1.1 Disclosure 
The first points in the index were awarded for a company making a statement on their corporate 
governance policy, for including a reference to the ASX Principles, and for making an assessment of 
whether the company currently complies with ASX Principles (1 point for a general statement about the 
extent of compliance, 2 points for a detailed consideration of the Principles). The remainder of the index 
was an assessment of whether in fact the Principles were already being applied. 
 
The index includes a point each for disclosure of the board members‟ qualifications and 
experience, and another for disclosing their attendance at meetings.  These disclosures are required for 
stakeholders to judge the competency of the board.  The index does not endeavour to make an assessment 
of actual board competency on the basis of these disclosures, since to do so would be highly subjective.  
 
2.1.2 Independence 
To assess the strength of the oversight role performed by the board an assessment was made of the 
independence of the board and relevant committees (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006, Anderson et al. 2004). 
Independence has been a common essential requirement in all the regulatory recommendations regarding 
corporate governance. A board independent of the company and free from undue influence from any major 
shareholder enables the directors to carry out their oversight role in the best interests of all shareholders 
and to ensure that management is accountable to stakeholders. 
The number of members of the board and the recommended committees (audit, remuneration and 
nomination) was noted, and the proportion of independent members was calculated. In the absence of such 
a committee, the proportion was set to zero.
5
 Points were also included to note the separation of the role of 
CEO and chairperson (Balatbat, Taylor and Walter 2004) and for an independent chairperson.  As a 
further measure of the strength of the oversight role performed by the board, the number of board and audit 
committee meetings was considered.  Following the Horwarth Report (2002) recommendations, strong 
oversight was defined as the board meeting at least six times annually and the audit committee at least four 
times annually.   
 
Two measures were used for independence of directors. The first was simply whether the director 
is a non-executive director or not (Clarkson et al. 2006). Annual reports sometimes imply that the term 
non-executive indicates an independent director. As the Horwarth (2002) report points out, however, being 
a non-executive director merely means that a director is not currently a manager and is often far from 
meaning that the director is independent of the company. The second measure therefore took into account 
                                                        
5 Having regard to possible difficulties faced by smaller companies, it was permitted for a company to have combined 
remuneration/nomination committees provided that the duties of the combined committee were clearly stated to include both oversight roles. 
If a company did not have a committee performing either role, then the score was given as zero. 
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the recommendations for best practice per the IFSA “Blue Book” 2004 and ASX Principle 2, and strictly 
applied a director was only considered independent if he/she satisfied all of the following:  
 non-executive 
 had an interest in less than 5% of the company‟s voting share capital, 
 had not held an executive position in the company in the past three years 
 had not had any material interest in a contractual relationship/consultancy with the company other 
than the directorship and had no other obvious personal connection with executive directors.  
 had not served on the Board for a prolonged period likely to materially effect independence (as a 
guide this study presumed 10 years to be the maximum) 
 
This was assessed based on information gleaned from the 2003 annual report of the company, 
particularly disclosure of directors‟ interests, related party transactions and general description of directors‟ 
positions held.  
 
2.1.3 External audit 
As the Board is also responsible for the appointment of the external auditors, it was noted whether 
or not a leading external audit firm had been appointed. Audit firm size was used as a proxy for quality 
(Clarkson et al. 2006; DeAngelo 1981; Francis, Khurana and Pereira 2003). One point was awarded for a 
“Big Four” audit firm.  The proportion of audit fee charged compared to the fees for other services 
provided was also calculated. It is assumed that an auditor will be more independent the higher the 
proportion of the fee relates to the audit, as this reduces potential conflicts of interest. 
 
2.1.4 Procedures 
Finally, points were awarded a company for having adopted procedures suggested by ASX Principles 1 and 
3. One point was awarded if the company laid down guidelines for board/management duties (e.g. Charter).  
A further point was awarded if the company disclosed that it had a Code of Conduct. 
2.2 Assessment of sustainability 
The published annual financial reports of each of the companies in the sample were examined for 
the inclusion or otherwise of a statement on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or Sustainability.  In 
addition, sample firms with separate sustainability or CSR reports were identified. The total number of 
pages devoted to sustainability reporting was captured for each company. 
 
2.3 Sample and data 
Assessed default risk is captured by an independent assessment of the risk to lenders - a firm‟s 
individual credit rating supplied by Standard and Poor‟s (S & P).  Companies often acknowledge the 
importance of credit ratings in raising non equity finance.  Indeed, many quote their credit rating 
(particularly if it has improved during the period) in their annual report, as an indication of their risk 
standing. 
 
Credit ratings for 82 Australian companies were obtained from S & P for the financial year to 30
th
 
June 2004.  However several of these companies were excluded from our final sample.  S & P rates 
entities at their request as well as rating companies for their own database. Entities may seek a credit rating 
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in order to obtain finance, or in contemplation of listing. The original list contained a number of private 
(Pty Ltd) companies as well as subsidiaries of other companies not publishing separate financial data. 
There were also a number of delistings and mergers/demergers and one company under voluntary 
administration. The final sample ultimately consisted of 38 companies which met the criteria of being non 
finance/banking/insurance
6
 and which held an S & P credit rating in 2004 and filed an annual report in 
2003.  The mean market capitalisation for this sample is M$5,841; with this measure of firm size varying 
between M$96.2 and M$44,239. 
 
TABLE 2 - Reconciliation original data set to final sample 
 
 
No. 
2004 S & P Rated (non banking/finance) 82 
Exclusion reason  
Delisted  7 
No information - government 4 
No information - Pty or trust 23 
Subsidiary 7 
Merger/demerger 1 
Start up during year 1 
Voluntary administration 1 
 
Final sample 
 
38 
The information for constructing the corporate governance index, sustainability disclosures, and 
for the control variables was obtained from the 2003 annual reports, and from the databases AspectHuntley 
DatAnalysis, AspectHuntley FinAnalysis and Connect 4. In 2003 there was no obligation for companies to 
report their degree of compliance with the ASX Principles, therefore the inclusion of a corporate 
governance statement was voluntary. The main areas of the report where such information was found were 
the board of director‟s report, any corporate governance statement made, details of directors‟ qualifications, 
experience, past employment and directorships if given, details of shareholdings and directors‟ interests 
and notes to the financial statements, particularly related party transactions.  
 
2.4 Descriptive statistics 
The S & P Global (Long Term) Credit Rating Scale ranges from AAA (Extremely Strong Capacity) 
to D (Payment Default).  This was converted to a 22 point ordinal scale such that AAA equated to 22, BB 
(Less vulnerable) equated to 11 and D equated to 1 (see Table 3).  This is similar to the scale used in USA 
Studies by Anderson et al. (2004) who used credit ratings to control for differences in default risk, by Reeb, 
Mansi and Allee (2001), and by Ahmed et al. (2002); although this latter study followed Compustat‟s 
                                                        
6 Insurance and financial service companies were excluded, as the regulations affecting such companies regarding governance practices are 
substantially different from other listed companies. 
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conversion of ratings with larger values corresponding to a less favourable debt rating. S & P defines its 
issuer credit ratings as an assessment of the firm‟s financial capacity and willingness to pay its financial 
obligations, „based on current information furnished by obligors or obtained by Standard & Poor‟s from 
other sources it considers reliable.
7
 A „key dimension‟ of the ratings are financial ratios for measuring 
performance and financial structure. Descriptive statistics for the sample are shown in Table 4. The highest 
credit rating in the sample was AA- (SPRATE = 19) and the lowest was CCC (SPRATE = 5), while the 
median was BBB+ (SPRATE = 15). 
Table 4 also shows descriptive statistics for our corporate governance index and its key components, 
sustainability disclosures, and several firm characteristics.  The highest CGSCORE was 96.9% (25.2/26), 
while the lowest was 42.7% (11.1/26). The mean and median corporate governance scores were 74.9% and 
80.3% respectively.  The mean disclosure score (DISCL) was 82.7% (5.8/7), with a wide range between 
14.3% and 100%. Only one company made no corporate governance statement and 18/38 companies (47%) 
scored 7/7.  The mean board size was 8 members and 3 members for the audit committee. The mean score 
for overall independence (INDEP) was 72%, again with a range from 31% to 99%. The mean proportion of 
board member independence (BDIND) was 49%, with 19/38 companies (50%) having a majority 
independent board. For audit committees the mean proportion of member independence (ACIND) rose to 
68%, with 34/38 (89%) companies assessed as having a majority independent audit committee and 10/38 
(26%) fully independent. The mean proportion of non executive directors on the Board was 75% for the 
sample, with 100% on audit committees.  Ten of our sample companies issued a separate sustainability or 
CSR report.  When both annual and separate report disclosures were considered, there was substantial 
variation in the extent of sustainability reporting; with the number of pages devoted to these disclosures 
ranging between 0 and 82, with a mean (median) of 11.63 (2.00). 
TABLE 3 – Credit Rating Scale 
Rating Scale Index  S & P Description 
AAA 22 Extremely strong capacity  
AA + 21   
AA 20 Very strong capacity  
AA- 19   
A + 18   
A 17 Strong capacity 
A- 16   
BBB + 15   
BBB 14 Adequate capacity  
BBB- 13   
BB + 12   
BB 11 Less vulnerable  
                                                        
7 Standard & Poor‟s Website: http://www2.standardandpoors.com 
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Table 3 continued… 
BB- 10   
B + 9   
B 8 More vulnerable 
B - 7   
CCC+ 6   
CCC 5 Currently vulnerable  
CCC- 4   
CC 3 Currently highly vulnerable  
C 2 Administration/Bankruptcy 
D 1 Payment default 
  Notes: 
Global Rating Scale Source: Presentation made by Chris Dalton, Managing Director, Standard & Poor‟s 
Australia & New Zealand, Melbourne Financial Services Symposium, Wednesday 17
th
 March 2004 
www.users.bigpond.com/bradleyjon/SP/Standard_Poors.ppt 
Standard & Poor‟s Credit Ratings Definitionshttp://w.0.standardandpoors.com.au/ 
 
TABLE 4 - Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of 38 Companies (based on 
2003 data) 
Measure Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
SPRATE 14.454  15.000  2.818  5.000  19.000  
CGSCORE 0.749  0.803  0.177  0.427  0.969  
DISCL 0.827  0.929  0.235  0.143  1.000  
INDEP 0.720  0.774  0.223  0.309  0.989  
AUDIT 0.799  0.804  0.114  0.500  0.977  
PROC 0.645  0.500  0.347  0.000  1.000  
BDIND 0.493  0.497  0.214  0.000  0.917  
ACIND 0.682  0.667  0.264  0.000  1.000  
BDSIZE 7.686  7.958  2.427  4.000  14.500  
ACSIZE 3.189  3.000  1.337  0.000  6.000  
SUST 11.630 2.000 22.488 0.000 82.000 
SIZE 8.078  7.951  1.273  4.977  10.675  
LEV 0.437  0.266  0.583  0.000  2.650  
GROW 0.892  0.966  0.151  0.357  1.000  
PER 0.123  0.106  0.088  0.020  0.528  
Notes: 
SPRATE = Standard & Poor‟s credit rating for the firm at 30 June 2004 
 
CGSCORE = the proportional score (x/26) on the corporate governance index  
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DISCL = is the disclosure score from the corporate governance index expressed as a proportion, x/7  
INDEP = is the independence score from the corporate governance index expressed as a proportion, x/15  
AUDIT = is the external audit score from the corporate governance index expressed as a proportion, x/2  
PROC = is the procedure score from the corporate governance index expressed as a proportion, x/2  
BDIND =  the proportion of independent directors on the Board during the annual report period  
ACIND =  the proportion of independent directors on the Audit Committee during the annual report 
period  
BDSIZE =  the mean number of directors on the Board during the annual report period  
ACSIZE =  the mean number of directors on the Audit Committee during the annual report period  
SUST = total number of pages devoted to sustainability reporting 
SIZE = natural log of book value of assets  
LEV = book value long term debt/market value common equity end of year  
GROW = Measure for growth: Proportion of tangible assets to total assets  
PER = ratio of cash flows (EBITDA) to total assets, where EBITDA is earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation. 
 
All 38 companies in the sample were audited by one of the „Big 4‟ audit firms, so any variation in 
AUDIT score was in respect of the relative proportion of audit/non audit related fees paid to the audit firm 
during the year. One firm provided no breakdown of audit firm fees, (and therefore scored 1/2 for having a 
Big 4 audit firm only), otherwise the minimum proportion of audit/non audit fees was 16% and the 
maximum 95%, with a mean of 61%. Firms were more likely to have a Code of Conduct (31/38 firms or 
82%) than a Board Charter explicitly outlining the role of the Board (18/38 or 47%). Many of the 
companies, however, had introduced a Charter since the 2003 year end or stated that they were reviewing 
corporate governance procedures in the light of the ASX Principles and intended introducing one for 2004. 
 
3. Analysis 
 
The following model (Model 1) was used to test hypotheses 1 and 2 that a firm‟s credit rating is 
positively related to the quality of its corporate governance practices and the voluntary disclosure of 
sustainability information: 
 
SPRATEt+1 = α + β1CGSCOREt + β2SUSTt +β3SIZEt + β4LEVt +β5GROWt + β6PERt + μt 
 
Where year t is 2003,  SPRATEt+1 is the S & P credit rating for the firm at 30 June 2004, 
CGSCORE is the proportional score (x/26) on the corporate governance index and SUST is the number of 
pages devoted to sustainability reporting.  Following prior research and the factors suggested by S & P, 
several control variables were also included.  Larger firms and higher performing firms are associated 
with lower risk and are therefore expected to have a higher credit rating and a lower cost of debt (Sengupta, 
1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Anderson et al. 2004; Balatbat et al. 2004).  The natural log of book 
value of assets captures firm size (SIZE). Firm performance (PER) is measured as the ratio of cash flows 
(EBITDA) to total assets, where EBITDA is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. 
On the other hand, high leverage and growth firms are associated with higher risk and therefore a higher 
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cost of debt and a lower credit rating (Sengupta 1998; Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003; Anderson et al. 2004; 
Balatbat et al. 2004).  Book value long term debt/market value common equity measures leverage (LEV). 
Growth firms (GROW) are captured by the proportion of tangible assets to total assets.   
The regression results for this model are shown in Table 5.  Corporate governance index scores 
(CGSCORE) is not significantly related to credit rating. Indeed, it is insignificant in the wrong direction. 
Further, sustainability disclosures (SUST) are not significantly related to credit rating. The only significant 
variables were SIZE, LEV and GROW. Size was positively related to credit ratings and leverage negatively 
correlated, as expected. However growth was positively associated with credit ratings, which is surprising 
as growth is generally associated with increased risk.   
TABLE 5 – Regression Results for the sample of 38 ASX listed companies 
(Dependent variable is S & P rating 2004; Other variables based on 2003 annual 
reports.  Figures in parenthesis are t statistics) 
Variable Predicted sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
     
Intercept 
 
 -0.788 
(-0.212) 
0.128 
(0.027) 
1.111 
(0.315) 
CGSCORE 
 
+ -0.317 
(-0.152) 
  
SUST 
 
+ -0.003 
(-0.192) 
-0.007 
(-0.372) 
-0.005 
(-0.278) 
DISCL 
 
+  -1.444 
(-0.653) 
 
INDEP 
 
+  -0.669 
(-0.310) 
 
AUDIT 
 
+  -0.735 
(-0.196) 
 
PROC 
 
+  1.350 
(1.059) 
 
CEO 
CHAIR 
+   -1.576 
(-1.666) 
BDIND 
 
+   0.433 
0.211 
BDSIZE 
 
+   -0.092 
(-0.468) 
SIZE 
 
+ 1.277 
(4.160)** 
1.337 
(3.913)** 
1.308 
(3.305)** 
LEV 
 
_ -1.306 
(-2.073)* 
-1.275 
(-1.903)* 
-1.519 
(-2.378)* 
GROW 
 
_ 6.889 
(2.798)** 
6.242 
(2.456)* 
5.917 
(2.362)* 
PER + 
 
-3.022 
(-0.730) 
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Table 5 continued… 
Adj R2 
 
 0.437 0.412 0.459 
F 
 
 5.780** 
 
4.244** 
 
5.485** 
 
Notes: 
*significant at <0.05, ** significant at <0.01; As the sign of the variables is predicted, the p values shown 
are one tailed 
CEOCHAIR =  a dichotomous variable, being 1 if the CEO position is separate from the Board Chair (i.e. 
not the same director), otherwise 0, during the annual report period  
Other variable definitions are the same as shown for Table 4 
 
TABLE 6 – Pearson and Spearman Correlations for 38 ASX listed companies (Pearson 
correlations are above diagonal; p values are shown in parenthesis) 
 
S
P
R
A
T
E
 
C
G
S
C
O
R
E
 
S
U
S
T
 
D
IS
C
L
 
IN
D
E
P
 
A
U
D
IT
 
P
R
O
C
 
C
E
O
C
H
A
IR
 
B
D
IN
D
 
B
D
S
IZ
E
 
S
IZ
E
 
L
E
V
 
G
R
O
W
 
P
E
R
 
S
P
R
A
T
E
  0.049 
(0.770) 
0.225 
(0.175) 
-0.169 
(0.310) 
0.139 
(0.406) 
0.076 
(0.649) 
0.020 
(0.907) 
-0.215 
(0.194) 
0.152 
(0.361) 
0.325* 
(0.046) 
0.523** 
(0.001) 
-0.362* 
(0.026) 
0.381* 
(0.018) 
0.053 
(0.753) 
C
G
S
C
O
R
E
 
0.053 
(0.751) 
 0.196 
(0.238) 
0.711** 
(0.000) 
0.918** 
(0.000) 
-0.009 
(0.957) 
0.529 
(0.001) 
0.587** 
(0.000) 
0.681** 
(0.000) 
0.298 
(0.069) 
0.244 
(0.139) 
-0.095 
(0.569) 
-0.194 
(0.243) 
0.220 
(0.185) 
S
U
S
T
 0.400* 
(0.013) 
0.595** 
(0.000) 
 -0.024 
(0.886) 
0.286 
(0.082) 
-0.271 
(0.100) 
0.056 
(0.741) 
0.023 
(0.892) 
0.315 
(0.054) 
0.315 
(0.054) 
0.409* 
(0.011) 
-0.174 
(0.295) 
-0.044 
(0.793) 
0.120 
(0.474) 
D
IS
C
L
 
-0.096 
(0.566) 
0.707** 
(0.000) 
0.369* 
(0.022) 
 0.406* 
(0.012) 
-0.300 
(0.067) 
0.528** 
(0.001) 
0.523** 
(0.001) 
0.370* 
(0.022) 
0.055 
(0.745) 
-0.063 
(0.706) 
0.125 
(0.454) 
-0.160 
(0.338) 
0.062 
(0.710) 
IN
D
E
P
 0.154 
(0.357) 
0.882** 
(0.000) 
0.529** 
(0.001) 
0.415** 
(0.010) 
 0.072 
(0.668) 
0.270 
(0.102) 
0.453** 
(0.004) 
0.704** 
(0.000) 
0.395* 
(0.014) 
0.391* 
(0.015) 
-0.178 
(0.284) 
-0.202 
(0.225) 
0.269 
(0.102) 
A
U
D
IT
 0.115 
(0.492) 
-0.036 
(0.828) 
-0.176 
(0.290) 
-0.329* 
(0.044) 
0.014 
(0.935) 
 -0.031 
(0.854) 
-0.056 
(0.740) 
0.016 
(0.924) 
0.010 
(0.951) 
0.020 
(0.907) 
-0.060 
(0.720) 
0.106 
(0.525) 
-0.028 
(0.869) 
P
R
O
C
 
-0.023 
(0.893) 
0.544** 
(0.000) 
0.187 
(0.261) 
0.466** 
(0.003) 
0.257 
(0.119) 
0.034 
(0.838) 
 0.498** 
(0.001) 
0.237 
(0.152) 
-0.076 
(0.651) 
-0.143 
(0.391) 
-0.039 
(0.818) 
0.031 
(0.852) 
0.015 
(0.931) 
C
E
O
C
H
A
IR
 
-0.277 
(0.092) 
0.548** 
(0.000) 
0.216 
(0.192) 
0.376* 
(0.020) 
0.443** 
(0.005) 
-0.077 
(0.644) 
0.447** 
(0.005) 
 0.294 
(0.073) 
-0.041 
(0.807) 
-0.003 
(0.986) 
-0.146 
(0.383) 
-0.164 
(0.326) 
0.237 
(0.152) 
B
D
IN
D
 0.076 
(0.651) 
0.707** 
(0.000) 
0.481** 
(0.002) 
0.305 
(0.063) 
0.771** 
(0.000) 
0.046 
(0.783) 
0.187 
(0.262) 
0.294 
(0.073) 
 0.424** 
(0.008) 
0.489** 
(0.002) 
-0.101 
(0.546) 
-0.287 
(0.081) 
0.237 
(0.152) 
Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 
ISSN 1946-052X 
200X, Vol. 1, No. 1: E1 
www.macrothink.org/ajfa 
 
47 
Table 6 continued… 
B
D
S
IZ
E
 
0.308 
(0.060) 
0.338* 
(0.038) 
0.459** 
(0.004) 
0.114 
(0.495) 
0.480** 
(0.002) 
0.029 
(0.861) 
-0.119 
(0.477) 
-0.050 
(0.767) 
0.462** 
(0.004) 
 0.667** 
(0.000) 
-0.137 
(0.412) 
-0.139 
(0.404) 
0.269 
(0.102) 
S
IZ
E
 
0.494** 
(0.002) 
0.360* 
(0.026) 
0.595** 
(0.000) 
0.156 
(0.350) 
0.468** 
(0.003) 
-0.122 
(0.466) 
-0.107 
(0.524) 
-0.040 
(0.810) 
0.507** 
(0.001) 
0.651** 
(0.000) 
 -0.032 
(0.850) 
-0.082 
(0.625) 
0.174 
(0.295) 
L
E
V
 -0.115 
(0.490) 
0.025 
(0.882) 
-0.039 
(0.817) 
0.162 
(0.330) 
0.001 
(0.996) 
0.030 
(0.857) 
-0.004 
(0.981) 
0.102 
(0.542) 
0.003 
(0.985) 
0.001 
(0.997) 
0.084 
(0.618) 
 -0.235 
(0.155) 
-0.076 
(0.650) 
G
R
O
W
 0.347* 
(0.033) 
-0.264 
(0.109) 
-0.054 
(0.748) 
-0.206 
(0.215) 
-0.340* 
(0.037) 
0.167 
(0.316) 
0.073 
(0.663) 
-0.236 
(0.154) 
-0.302 
(0.065) 
-0.382* 
(0.018) 
-0.174 
(0.297) 
-0.307 
(0.061) 
 0.091 
(0.587) 
P
E
R
 
0.014 
(0.932) 
0.306 
(0.061) 
0.152 
(0.361) 
0.219 
(0.187) 
0.320 
(0.050) 
-0.270 
(0.101) 
0.062 
(0.712) 
0.325* 
(0.046) 
0.262 
(0.113) 
0.232 
(0.162) 
0.155 
(0.351) 
0.064 
(0.704) 
-0.148 
(0.375) 
 
Notes: 
*significant at <0.05, ** significant at <0.01 (two-tailed) 
Variable definitions are the same as shown for Table 4 
 
 
A correlation matrix showing both Pearson and Spearman‟s rho correlations is presented in Table 
6.  Given the small sample size and non-normal distributions for some of our variables, the following 
discussion focuses on the Spearman‟s rho results.  SUST is significantly positively correlated with 
CGSCORE and SIZE, and GCSCORE is positively correlated with SIZE.  However none of these 
correlations are high enough to induce multicollenearity problems into the model.  Interestingly, SUST is 
significantly positively correlated (ρ = 0.400) with credit rating (SPRATE).  However as the results in 
Table 5 show, this relationship becomes insignificant when firm size is controlled.  These results suggest 
that larger firms have both better credit ratings and corporate governance and sustainability disclosures. 
 
In order to determine whether one particular aspect of the CGSCORE was driving the (lack of) 
results, it was decided to disaggregate the index into its constituent parts as per the corporate governance 
index shown in Table 1 (Model 2).  DISCL is the disclosure score from the index expressed as a 
proportion (x/7). INDEP is the independence score (x/15). AUDIT is the external audit score (x/2), while 
PROC is the procedure score (x/2).  In the interest of parsimony, PER was dropped from these regressions.  
Again the only significant variables were SIZE, LEV and GROW, all with the same signs as the previous 
models. All the disaggregated CGSCORE elements were insignificant, and all except one still had signs 
contrary to prediction (i.e. negative). The only corporate governance variable with a positive sign was 
PROC (the proportion of score for having a Board Charter and a Code of Conduct), but still not a 
significant influence on credit ratings. Spearman‟s rho correlations between these variables indicate that 
INDEP is positively correlated with SIZE (possibly larger companies are able to have an increased Board 
size and accommodate more independent outside directors thus enabling a more independent governance 
structure overall). The individual corporate governance indicators also tended to be correlated with each 
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other: INDEP positively related to DISCL and DISCL positively correlated with PROC.   SUST is 
positively correlated with DISCL and INDEP suggesting that independent boards are more likely to 
disclose both corporate governance and sustainability information. 
 
CGSCORE was further disaggregated based on individual aspects of corporate governance found 
to be significant in prior research (Model 3). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al (2006) found credit ratings to be 
positively related to board independence and negatively associated with increased CEO power (i.e. 
negatively associated with the CEO and Board Chair being the same person). Anderson et al. (2004) found 
cost of debt to be inversely related to board size and independence and also audit committee independence, 
size and meeting frequency. Board and audit committee and independence and size are likely to be 
correlated, so it was decided to test Board independence, board size and separation of CEO/Board Chair.  
Again the variables SIZE, LEV and GROW were significant, all with the same signs as the 
previous models. BDIND was positive and BDSIZE negative (contrary to expectations for BDSIZE) but 
both had no explanatory significance regarding the proxy for cost of debt (credit ratings). CEOCHAIR was 
marginally significant but was negatively related to the credit ratings, in other words having a separate 
CEO/Board Chair had a negative effect on ratings. CEOCHAIR was not highly correlated with any other 
variable in this model. BDIND was significantly positively correlated with firm SIZE and therefore might 
be significant but this is masked by the correlation. BDSIZE was also significantly correlated with firm 
SIZE.  SUST is positively correlated with both BDSIZE and BDIND. 
We also tested whether industry type or cross-listing were influential. Specifically it was expected 
that mining might be higher risk (negative relationship with credit ratings) and real estate might be lower 
risk (positive relationship with credit ratings), and cross listing might affect corporate governance 
positively (so improve credit ratings).  However results of these additional tests indicate that none of 
these variables were influential. 
Table 7 presents diagnostic tests for each of the regression models shown in Table 5. The 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test indicates that there is heteroscedasticity for models 1 and 2.  These models 
were therefore re-estimated using White‟s correction.  This yielded results essentially the same as those 
shown in Table 5.  Jarque-Bera test statistics indicate that the residuals for each of our models do not 
depart from the normal distribution.  Durbin-Whatson statistics indicate no autocorrelation of residuals 
for model 1, while models 2 and 3 fall within the indecision areas indicating possible autocorrelation 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).   
 
TABLE 7 – Diagnostic test statistics (figures in parenthesis are probabilities) 
Test statistic Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey  2.491 
(0.044) 
2.833 
(0.019) 
1.777 
(0.123) 
Jarque-Bera  0.307 
(0.858) 
0.198 
(0.906) 
0.592 
(0.744) 
Durbin-Whatson  2.020 
 
1.778 
 
1.596 
Ramsey RESET  3.035 
(0.064) 
3.347 
(0.050) 
4.013 
(0.030) 
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Ramsey‟s RESET (regression specification error test) is a general test for misspecification of a 
model‟s functional form [Brooks (2002); Gujarati (2003)].  Results of these tests indicate that model 1 is 
not misspecified, while model 3 is misspecified and model 2 is marginal. A significant F statistic from the 
RESET test is indicative of non-linear parameters in the model or a relevant variable omitted from the 
model [Brooks (2002); Gujarati (2003)].  OLS estimation produces biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates when non-linear parameters are assumed linear in the model (Kmenta, 1971).  Overall, the 
results of diagnostic tests indicate some potential concerns with models 2 and 3, while model 1 results can 
be considered reliable. 
 
 
4. Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
Our results indicate that Australian annual report disclosures about corporate governance practices 
are not useful for the assessment of default risk.  This result is in contrast to prior research conducted in 
the US that finds significant relationships between some aspects of corporate governance quality and 
factors associated with the cost of debt.  Our results also indicate that Australian annual report disclosures 
about sustainability practices are not useful for the assessment of default risk when firm size is controlled. 
It appears that larger firms have both better credit ratings and corporate governance and sustainability 
disclosures. 
 
There are several potential reasons for the disparity between our corporate governance results and 
those found in the US.  First, the disclosures recommended by the ASX Corporate Governance Principles 
may be inadequate for the purpose of assessing default risk.  They do not provide information about 
several of the factors found to be significantly related to credit ratings and measures of the cost of debt 
used in prior research.  These include institutional ownership, the presence of blockholders, board stock 
ownership, and indicators of takeover defences, board expertise, disclosure and accruals quality and 
earnings timeliness. 
 
Alternatively for 2003, a year prior to the introduction of mandatory reporting by exception 
required by the ASX Corporate Governance Principles, it may simply be difficult for lenders (and for 
Standard and Poor‟s) to make more than a cursory assessment of corporate governance practices or to 
make comparisons between firms due to lack of disclosure and the non uniformity of where in the annual 
report any disclosure is made. Future studies may wish to examine data from prior to contemplation of the 
ASX Principles, perhaps in comparison with a post ASX CG Principles sample, or to conduct a 
longitudinal study. Recent research in Australia suggests that firms provide quality disclosure only when 
these requirements are „black letter‟ or mandatory (Clarkson et al. 2006).  
 
There have also been changes to sustainability reporting practices over the past few years. The 
KPMG survey of G250 companies drawn from the Fortune Global 500 List (2007), published in 2008, 
states that “corporate responsibility reporting has gone mainstream” with a rise in CSR reporting in large 
companies from 79% presenting a stand-alone report compared to 52% in a similar survey from 2005, and 
a further 4% of companies incorporating CSR data in their annual reports. KPMG argue this clearly 
indicates an economic incentive for such corporate reporting. The survey report suggests that volume does 
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not necessarily equate to quality. Many CSR reports lack integration with the financial data. Most reporting 
companies appear to have corporate governance and sustainability strategies, but few give details 
regarding implementation and monitoring of these. Other criticisms include a lack of stakeholder reference 
and feedback, a comparative lack of environmental and social detailed information, and despite a growing 
trend in formal assurance, this has still not been widely adopted. Aspects to watch for the future do include 
supply chain relationships as sustainability issues grow beyond an individual corporation, and the role of 
corporate governance and CSR reporting in corporate risk management strategy.  
 
Similarly the latest biannual sustainability reporting, transparency and disclosure benchmarking 
survey from SustainAbility Inc, “Tomorrow‟s Value”, published in conjunction with the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and Standard & Poor's, exposes a shift in corporate attitude to reporting.  
Firms are beginning to seek strategic advantage in the area of sustainability and see opportunities for value 
creation rather than simple risk management. Financial markets also value the additional information for 
investors. Many firms have included sustainability issues in their core business strategy but few appear to 
be using their influence to lobby for change outside their organisation (SustainAbility 2006). This may of 
course reflect a lack of real commitment and a wish concentrate on internal “good news”. 
 
It seems likely that a similar project to the one reported in this paper, drawn on more recent data, 
may find more significant results. It is also possible that with a relatively small sample, even though the 
residual degrees of freedom were never less than 30 in any of the models, the peculiarities of the sample 
may drive the results. The sample size in this study was limited by the availability of the data – a lack of S 
& P credit ratings for many Australian firms. In order to increase the sample size, future studies might seek 
alternatives to credit ratings, such as corporate-debt yield spreads (Anderson et al. (2004)), as the measure 
for the cost of debt. 
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